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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
INTERSTATE INCOME PROPERTIES,
INC., a Utah corporation, and BRB-5 A,
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D. GREGORY HALES aka DON
GREGORY HALES aka D. ROBERT
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Appellate No. 20100025

Defendants and Appellants.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
Defendants/Appellants La Jolla Loans, Inc. and its assignees (collectively "La Jolla"),
respectfully submit this Reply Brief. In the Brief of Appellees, Interstate Income Properties,
Inc. ("Interstate"), and BRB-5 A, LLC, a/k/a BRB-5 (hereinafter "BRB-5"), attempt to
recharacterize the issues on appeal as: (i) whether La Jolla sufficiently marshaled the
evidence; and (ii) whether the trial court's findings of fact are supported by the record. By
trying to re-frame the issues, Plaintiffs miss the points raised in La Jolla's appeal and, in so
doing, Plaintiffs ignore the actual legal issues before this Court. La Jolla is not challenging
1

the basic underlying factual findings. Instead, La Jolla is challenging certain legal decisions
made by the trial court along the path it took in ultimately determining that La Jolla's deed
of trust was a wrongful lien and void ab initio. In other words, in reaching its decision, the
trial court made various legal conclusions and determinations that were not correct. It is
these decisions that La Jolla challenges on appeal.
REPLY TO STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiffs made several factual statements that are deserving of note.
1.

There is no dispute that Interstate attempted to transfer Pad A to BRB-5 on

October 22, 1997. See Br. of Appellees at 4.
2.

There is no dispute that BRB-5fs articles of organization were filed on October

24, 1997. Id.
3.

There is no dispute that Barbara Busch signed the quit claim deed without any

indication of her corporate capacity or authority. Id. at 4-5,
4.

There is no dispute that the trial court specifically determined that: (1) on

October 22, 1997, Interstate conveyed Pad A to BRB 5; (2) that the quit claim deed
transferred all of Interstate's interest in Pad A to BRB 5; (3) that the quit claim deed was
recorded on October 24, 1997; (4) that D. Gregory Hales ("Hales"), as a putative officer of
Interstate, executed a quit claim deed conveying Pad A to Carlsbad Development, LLC
("Carlsbad"); and (5) Carlsbad executed a deed of trust in favor of La Jolla, which was
recorded on June 8, 2007. See R. at 886-87.
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5.

The trial court granted Plaintiffs' petition to nullify La Jolla's deed of trust,

declaring it to be null and void. R. at 888 & 901.
6.

Lastly, there is no dispute that the trial court did not make any findings or

determinations about winding up, the intended delivery date for the October 22, 1997 quit
claim deed, or Hales' actual or apparent authority to execute a quit claim deed conveying Pad
A from Interstate to Carlsbad.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
LA JOLLA IS NOT CHALLENGING THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT;
HENCE, IT IS NOT REQUIRED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE.
After correctly setting forth the standard and various policy pronouncements
applicable to marshaling evidence, Appellees argue that a trial court's determination that a
document filed against an owner's property is a wrongful lien is a highly fact-dependent
question. Br. of Appellees at 11. Appellees then endeavor to recharacterize the issues on
appeal, arguing that "La Jolla challenges the trial court's determination that, based upon the
facts presented at the wrongful lien hearing, the La Jolla Deeds of Trust were wrongful
liens." Id. at 12. Appellees assert that "[t]his is a quintessential fact question." Id. In setting
up the issue as they did, Appellees have misread La Jolla's brief and they miss the point.
Appellees' argument conflates the factual determinations to be made in a wrongful
lien hearing and the legal conclusions to be determined by the court based on the facts found
by the court into one giant question of fact. This approach is wrong. There are questions of
3

fact that need to be determined. But this appeal deals with the conclusions of law based on
those facts. The cases cited by Appellees actually show, by way of contrast, that the issues
presented in this appeal are not challenges to findings of fact made by the trial court; instead,
La Jolla is appealing the legal questions determined by the trial court.
For example, in Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, the defendants argued that there was
"no evidence" supporting the trial court's findings relied on to justify a preliminary
injunction. Id. at ^J 82. The Court rejected the argument noting that the record contained
findings of fact and the defendants' attempt to point to facts that would support findings
contrary to the trial court was not sufficient to convince the Court that the trial court's
findings were erroneous. Id. at 82-83. Notably, the defendants were not arguing that the trial
court adopted the wrong standard when issuing the preliminary injunction-that would have
been a legal issue.
In this case, La Jolla is not challenging, for example, the finding that Appellees
incorporated BRB-5 on October 24, 1997 or that the quit claim deed to Pad A was executed
on October 22, 1997. If that was La Jolla's argument (e.g., that the trial court should have
found that La Jolla incorporated on October 26, 1997 or that the transfer of Pad A occurred
on some different date), then La Jolla agrees that it would have been required to marshal the
evidence. On the other hand, La Jolla is challenging the legal determination that BRB-5
existed on October 22,1997, when the quit claim deed was executed and delivered. Whether
or not a corporate entity actually existed on the delivery date is a question of law. The
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underlying findings on this issue are not disputed, i.e., that the quit claim deed was signed
on October 22, 1997 and the articles of organization were filed on October 24, 1997. The
dispute on appeal is the legal question involving the efficacy of the purported conveyance
on October 22, 1997.
Similarly, in Steenblik v. Lichfield, 906 P.2d 872 (Utah 1995), a jury found Lichfield
liable for securities violations, fraud, and negligence. On appeal, Lichfield argued that the
verdict was against the clear weight of the evidence. Id. at 875. For instance, Lichfield
argued that his relationship with an investment firm had been previously severed; thus, he
could not be liable under the securities act. Id. Reviewing the evidence, the court found
ample support for the jury's finding that Lichfield and the investment firm had an on-going
relationship. Id. at 876. Again, however, La Jolla is not suggesting that a finding of fact
made by the trial court is against the clear weight of the evidence. The parties generally
agree on the facts. The findings are not the issue in this appeal.
Likewise, in the case styled as In the Matter ofE.H. v. R.C. andS.C, 2006 UT 36, a
mother argued a trial court's determination that she relinquished her parental rights was
clearly erroneous. Id. at \ 3. The mother, however, failed to marshal any evidence regarding
the facts of her alleged relinquishment. Id. at % 65. The Court refused to consider her
arguments. Id.
The issues before the Court in that case versus the one sub judice are not even
remotely similar. La Jolla is not challenging factual findings since the dispositive facts are
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relatively undisputed; rather, La Jolla is challenging certain legal conclusions made by the
trial court based on those findings. And, this is precisely the point that is missed by
Appellees.
Lastly, Black's Law Dictionary defines "findings of fact" as a "decision upon a
question of fact," "a recital of the facts as found," "a conclusion drawn by trial court from
facts without the exercise of legal judgment." Black's Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990) at 632.
"Conclusions of law" are defined as "[propositions of law which judge arrives at after, and
as a result of, finding certain facts in case." Id. at 290. There is a distinct difference between
findings of fact and conclusions of law. Appellees, however, combine the two legal
principles into one and contend that La Jolla is appealing the trial court's findings of fact.
This is incorrect. The Court should not be induced to follow Appellees' invitation to view
the issues on appeal as challenges to the trial court's findings of fact. Marshaling is not
required in this appeal.
POINT II
INTERSTATE'S ATTEMPT TO CONVEY PAD A TO BRB- 5, A
NON-EXISTING ENTITY, THROUGH THE OCTOBER 22,1997
QUIT CLAIM DEED WAS INEFFECTIVE.
Plaintiffs contend that this Court should affirm the trial court's determination that the
October 22, 1997 quit claim deed was effective to transfer Pad A to BRB-5, which was not
organized on the presumed date of delivery. In support of this contention, Plaintiffs argue
that the quit claim deed "substantially" complied with Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-13.
6

Plaintiffs' argument about substantial compliance presupposes the very legal issue on
appeal. Can a party, who substantially complies with Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-13, convey title
to a non-existing entity? La Jolla directed this Court to scores of cases and secondary
authorities recognizing that a conveyance to an entity that has not been organized is a legal
nullity.
Plaintiffs argue that whether one can convey title to a non-existing entity is completely
irrelevant. Plaintiffs then baldly contend that the trial court "clearly considered whether or
not the 1997 Quit Claim Deed was delivered to BRB-5 through a transaction of business that
was incidental to BRB-5's organization." Br. of Appellees at 19.
First, there are no findings of fact made by the trial court about BRB-5's pre-filing
activities. More importantly, however, is the fact that the interpretation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 48-2c-404 is a question of law, not a determination of fact. What are permissible
"incidental" activities is a matter of statutory interpretation. As La Jolla pointed out in its
Brief, Plaintiffs were unable to offer any authorities at the wrongful lien hearing to support
the sweeping notion that conveyances of land are mere incidental pre-filing transactions. In
their response brief, Plaintiffs again failed to offer any legal support for their argument that
deeding title to property to a non-existing entity is an incidental transaction.
This Court should interpret Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-404 in light of the many cases
dealing with pre-filing activities. The cases clearly hold that one cannot convey title to a
non-existing entity. In this case, the October 22,1997 quit claim deed was delivered before
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the October 24, 1997 filing of BRB-5's articles. Whatever "incidental" means under the
statute, it must be something less than conveying property; otherwise, the interpretation
would effectively overrule the cases which hold property cannot be conveyed to a nonexisting entity.
Plaintiffs argue that the trial court's determinations that the 1997 Quit Claim Deed
"satisfied the statutory requirements of U.C.A. § 57-1-13" and "transferred all of Interstate's
interest in Pad A to BRB-5" (R. at 886), disposes of La Jolla's argument. Utah Code Ann.
§57-1-13 deals with form and effect of a quit claim deed. The statute sets out the required
language for quit claim deeds and states that when the quit claim deed is thus executed as
required by law, it conveys the interest of the grantor.1 Accordingly, this statute provides
what a legally sufficient quit claim deed should say at a minimum. It does not validate a
conveyance otherwise unacceptable under the law.
Under Plaintiffs' reading of the statute, a minor child, under duress, could execute a
quit claim deed to a non-existing trust, and if the trial court determined that the quit claim
deed satisfied the requirements of § 57-1-13 (said the right words, identified the grantor and
grantee and the property, and was signed and dated); then the conveyance can be affirmed

*It is interesting to note that Utah Code Ann. §§ 57-1-12 & -12.5 refer to a conveyance to
a "grantee." These related statutes show that there must be a valid grantee for the
conveyance to take effect. Thus, even if the deed in question substantially followed the
statutory form, if there is not a valid and proper grantee, there can be no conveyance.
8

by an appellate court. The problem with this approach is obvious. ( nncr ;CIIJ

luin

torpedoed that hypothetical transaction
It i tt lis c •; i y< , 1 1 le blow 1 1 ,: it si it lk : Plaintiffs' ship was the fact that B R B - 5 did not exist
on the presumed date o f delivery. That fact is undisputed. Thus, even if the quit claim deed
contained all o f the required statutory language (in other words, it satisfied the requirements
o f § 57-1-13), it cannot operate to convey at i interest it I lai id ie: • ai i ei itity that doe s not e::1 :1st.
W i n n the trial i mni d d e n n i n n l thai (lie ijini liiiiin deed effectively transferred Pad A from
Interstate to B R B - 5 , it committed a legal error.
Plaintiffs would bootstrap § 48-2c-404 to § 5 7 - 1 1 3 , arguing if y o u comply w a n the
latter, then the conveyance must be an acceptable "incidental" bi isil less ti ansactioi i II lis
example of cii ci llai reasoning is a IIPH starter

Section § 48-2e-404 does not allow a

company to transact business, except for certain, limited incidental pre-filing transactions.
One cannot create a backdoor to the express prohibition against conducting business by
relying on another statute that simply recognizes the minimum requirements In etfet 11\ ely
. • > . . .

is: Was the

October 22, 1997 quit claim deed a mere "incidental" pre-filing transaction that effectively
transferred Pad A to B R B - 5 , which was at the time a non-existing entity?
I a Jolla submits that the cases and great weight ot aulhoul, \ hold dial tin ' >cl<»kTJ2,
f^^cjiiil . |,n

I , i| 'wis a Iq'iil iiiiilil

If R R B :i iJiil IHII exist on October 22, 1997, to

w h o m was the property conveyed? Furthermore, if B R B - 5 did not exist on October 2 2 , 1 9 9 7 ,
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was the so-called "incidental" transaction supposed to be consummated whenever the parties
got around to actually organizing BRB-5, be that two days, two months, or two years after
the deed was signed? The obvious answer to these questions illustrates perfectly the legal
fallacy of Plaintiffs' arguments.2
Plaintiffs' discussion of the de facto corporation doctrine also confuses the argument.
The line of cases cited by La Jolla simply recognizes the abolishment of the de facto
corporation doctrine.

La Jolla agrees with Plaintiffs that the cases do not interpret

"incidental" transactions within the meaning of § 48-2c-404. The legal standard to be taken
from these cases is that under Utah law a corporation or LLC does not exist until its articles
are filed. It is that simple. There is no corporate entity unlil the organizing documents are
filed.
Plaintiffs admit that BRB-5 was not organized when the October 22,1997 quit claim
deed was executed and delivered. Plaintiffs' repeated efforts to characterize the transactions
as a mere "incidental" pre-filing transaction evidence as much. Accordingly, Plaintiffs argue

2

If pre-filing conveyances are permitted as so-called "incidental" transactions, there is no
principled way to determine how long of a delay is acceptable between conveying to a
non-existing entity and the actual organization of that entity. If two days is acceptable,
why not two months? Why not two years? According to Plaintiffs, it only matters that a
party intended the pre-filing transaction to be "incidental"; in other words, timing does
not matter. The only definite and clear line to draw, however, is the one that is based on
the actual organization of the entity. The law should not be required to suspend the
effectiveness of a transaction until parties decide to file organizing articles. Hence, if the
company did not exist on the purported transfer date, the transaction was a nullity. This is
the clear pronouncement of law the Court should make.
10

that they can legally effectuate an "incidental" transaction even though the established law
of the State dictates that a conveyance to a non-existing e t itit> is a legal i u illiih < Whei the
trial < ouil a|>a\vcl w illi IMmnlills it erred
POINT III
BARBARA BUSCH'S PERSONAL SIGNATURE ON THE QUIT CLAIM DEED
WAS A FATAL DEFECT,
It is not dispi ited that Barbara IBi isci 1 personally signed the cp lit clain 1 deed, without
am iiulit alien whatsoever as to her status or title as the signatory. Plaintiffs claim that Utah
Code Ann. § 57-143 does not require a corporate entity conveying land to have the signatory
designate his or her title/authority on the signature line. W hile it is true thai § •) "• I • I >' and
>K

•

:•

sivn a a r; • :«:

• •

\piv- * *•-.•«(- it.

ivua«ding

• :: it mean that there are no requirements regarding signatures on deeds.

As explained a: La Jolla's brief, Utah Code Ann § 57-2a-2 sets K»r:h the law regarding
acknowledged signatures; namely, that the person executed the document 101 lie purposes
stated therein. In nlliei \\c>td\ dial Barbara Buseli exeemied (lie tired indi\ alualh, and i nl on
behalf of Interstate.
Plaintiffs belabor the point that Barbara apparently executed the deed with actual
authority from Interstate. The issue is not w hethei Barbara Busch was authorized by
Inleistale to execute iHn: duu'l

I In; issue is wlitlliei liar exeeudon ot the deed w ithmil an

indication of her corporate capacity, was legally sufficient.
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Plaintiffs argue that an "objective review of the 1997 Quit Claim Deed reveals that
Barbara Busch signed in her capacity as director of IIP." Br. of Appellees at 16. The only
thing an objective review of the deed shows is that Barbara signed it without denoting her
corporate capacity-hence, she signed it individually. Nothing in the deed evidences her
authority to sign for Interstate. Under Plaintiffs' theory, anyone could have validly signed
the deed so long as they had actual authority from the corporation (for that is all there is in
this case). To remove the uncertainty that would result from Plaintiffs' proposed approach,
Utah Code Ann. § 57-2a-2 requires the agent to acknowledge the position held in the
corporation.
Paradoxically, Plaintiffs contend that nowhere in the deed is there a reference to
Barbara acting individually; thus, she must have been acting in a corporate capacity. This
argument turns the standard upside down. One does not need to list his or her status when
signing an instrument as an individual; rather, a signatory acting for a company is required
to list his or her status. It makes no sense to argue that the deed is devoid of any reference
to her individual capacity, when that is the default position absent some indication to the
contrary.
Plaintiffs' reliance on the word "substantially" in Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-13 is also
unavailing. Plaintiffs attempt to validate the conveyance so long as the deed "substantially"
complied with the Act. As noted above, Plaintiffs are misconstruing the intent and effect of
§ 57-1-13. This code section sets forth the minimum requirements of the language and form
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needed to convey property by quit claim deed, 1 lie actual language (nun tin Malum is
"substantially in the following form ' (emphasis addul)

,S<v also I Itah < 'ode Ann ^ ^ M-

1,2 & 11 > I In language i d o s (u tin (uiin of the deed. That is all.
This section cannot be used to revive an otherwise defective deed or conveyance. To
the extent that Barbara's signature failed to comply with the statutory requirements, no
amount of reliance of the form of language used ii I tl ic dec d a u 11 en ied\ that deficiency Hie
interpretation of these stalfiks (i e , aelsJiowledi'ed IV' requirements of § 57-2a-2 and
"substantially in the following form" of § 57 113), moreover, is a legal question to be
decided by this Court without deference to the trial court's decisions, The trial court erred
when it determined that Barbara Busch's individual signati ire was effecti\ e on tl le qi lit claim
deed,
Plaintiffs' arguments relating to Utah Code Ann. § 57~4a-4(g) are wrong. The
presumption is that the person executing the document holds the position so stated and has
the authority to sign the document. Where no pc>-

-..«;*.-«

'

'

e

presumption i.mfinl app!*, 1 Inder Plaintiff ' limn \ nf'tlie ease a presumption arises that the
signatory holds the unstated position and has the unstated authority to so act. This approach
does not make sense. The statute does not apply so broadly. Barbara may have had actual
authority based on some alleged meeting, bul nothing from the dei d nuiiM mdn ale dial was
the case.
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POINT IV
BECAUSE THE DISTRICT COURT FAILED TO MAKE SUFFICIENT
FINDINGS, THIS COURT CANNOT UPHOLD ITS DECISION TO VOID
THE LA JOLLA DEED OF TRUST
La Jolla pointed out that the trial court simply announced its ruling at the close of the
wrongful lien hearing. (Tr. at 120:20-22.) It did not make any specific findings about
winding up,3 the authority of Hales, or the intended delivery date. In their Response Brief,
Plaintiffs acknowledge as much.
Plaintiffs did not even attempt to point to any findings of the district court on these
issues, because there are no such findings. Instead, Plaintiffs argue that the trial court ruled
that the October 22, 1997 quit claim deed was effective; hence, no further inquiry on these
other issues was required. Plaintiffs' case stands-and falls- entirely on the effectiveness of
the October 22, 1997 quit claim deed that was executed and presumably delivered when
BRB-5 indisputedly did not exist. As La Jolla argued in its brief, if the October 22, 1997
quit claim deed is not effective, which it is not, then there are absolutely no other findings
or legal determinations by the district court to otherwise support nullification of La Jolla's
deed of trust.

3

The issue with respect to winding up is not whether Plaintiffs brought their claim in a
timely manner. On the contrary, in its brief La Jolla simply pointed out that the district
court failed to make any findings or legal determinations that BRB-5's claims were
statutorily authorized as "winding up" activities.
14

CONCLUSION
For 1 he irasons set loilh ulnnr (hr (%nitI should ivvetst' ilic li 1.1I t'oiirt and, if
i lecessary , remand for further proceedings.
DATED this 4th day of June, 2010.
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